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The focus of this article is on family policy reforms in four European coun-
tries – Austria, Finland, Portugal, and Slovenia – between 2008 and 2015. 
These years were marked by the ‘Great Recession’, and by the rise of the so-
cial-investment perspective. Social investment is an umbrella concept, though, 
and it is also somewhat ambiguous. This article distinguishes between different 
social-investment variants, which emerge from a focus on its interaction with 
alternative social-policy perspectives, namely social protection and austeri-
ty. We identify different variants along the degree of social-investment: from 
comprehensive, over crowding out, towards lean forms. While the empirical 
analysis highlights variation, it also shows how there is a specific crisis context, 
which may lead to ‘crowding out’ of other policy approaches and ‘leaner’ forms 
of social investment. This has led to strong cutbacks in family cash benefits, 
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INTRODUCTION
The 1970s and 1980s have often been 
denoted as the end of the ‘golden age’ of 
the welfare state, putting a halt to its ex-
pansion in post-war prosperity. Faced with 
low growth rates and rising unemploy-
ment, the recipe chosen by many countries 
was to ‘relieve’ labour markets. Alongside 
such measures as early retirement schemes, 
family policy was a key part of the reform 
programme and recourse to parental leave 
schemes was seen as ‘anti unemployment 
measures’ (see e.g. for Germany: Bothfeld, 
2005). Following the recent ‘Great Reces-
sion’ (Van Kersbergen et al., 2014), which 
started in 2008 or thereabouts, something 
significant changed. Especially at the EU 
level, one saw the rise of ideas of social 
investment (Bothfeld and Rouault, 2015). 
Through this perspective, which was in the 
making from the late 1990s, new forms of 
social policy are ascribed a positive eco-
nomic role. Investing social policies are 
thought ‘to increase employability and 
employment levels; to support labour mar-
ket fluidity […]; to prepare for the ‘knowl-
edge-based’ economy’ (Morel et al., 2012: 
12). Family policy may be said to be at the 
core of a social-investment strategy, since it 
centrally involves the wellbeing and func-
tioning of families, and may especially tar-
get labour-market participation and gender 
equality. ‘New’ social risks, lone parent-
hood and child poverty, for instance, have 
been highlighted as requiring a social-in-
vestment strategy (Esping-Andersen; Gallie 
et al., 2002). In times of crisis, family pol-
icies should no longer follow the recipe of 
‘taking pressure from labour markets’ (e.g. 
through extending leave), but rather upgrade 
while public childcare and parental leaves have proved more resilient in the 
investigated countries. Those findings are revelatory in the current Covid-19 
pandemic, where countries are entering a next, possibly larger economic crisis. 
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active inclusion strategies, e.g. through ‘af-
fordable quality childcare and education’ 
(European Commission, 2013a).
We take the rise of the notion of a ‘so-
cial investment welfare state’ (Morel et al., 
2012) during the last ‘economic crisis’ as a 
starting point to pose two questions. First, 
as social investment has been described 
as an ambiguous concept and its relation 
to classical social-protection policies as 
underexplored (Nolan, 2013; Bothfeld and 
Rouault, 2013), we aim at conceptually dis-
tinguishing between different social-invest-
ment forms through their relation to other 
social policy perspectives – namely social 
protection and austerity. Second, we pose 
the empirical question: what has been the 
role of those social investment variants in 
family policy reforms during the economic 
crisis years? 
Previous research has come to differ-
ing conclusions about social investment 
in times of an ‘austerity consensus’ (Farn-
sworth and Irving, 2012). Some studies in-
dicate that governments have indeed often 
safeguarded social-investment policies and 
additional ‘spending for the long run’ from 
cutbacks and have also upheld these invest-
ments during the crisis years – particularly 
in the family policy area of public childcare 
(see e.g. Adema and Ali, 2015; Windebank, 
2017). Others indicate that social invest-
ment policies have overseen forms of dis-
investment, linked to austerity, which also 
concern family policies (Ronchi, 2018; Van 
Kersbergen et al., 2014; Léon and Pavolini, 
2014). Relating to childcare, Bothfeld and 
Rouault (2013: 81) differentiate between dif-
ferent paths: a commitment for expansion, 
but also a need to reduce expenditure, which 
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1 By ‘post-crisis’ we denote policies adopted after the financial and economic crisis set in around 2008, ta-
king into account that the degrees to which reforms were crisis-related differ between policies and countries. 
We are also aware that the term ‘family policy’, while having gained prominence, does not exist in all countries 
as a distinct policy sector. It is therefore further defined in Section 3. 
2 De-familialising policies relax care obligations either through state or market provision (Esping-Ander-
sen, 1999: 6).    
governments may do by reducing quality 
standards or withdrawing public subsidies. 
Research is consistent in finding differing 
extents and types of social-investment poli-
cies among different countries (e.g. Bouget, 
et al., 2015). 
This article contributes to the litera-
ture by analysing post-crisis family policy 
reforms1 in four countries with different 
welfare state backgrounds, namely Austria, 
Finland, Portugal and Slovenia. Its findings 
are revelatory in the current Covid-19 pan-
demic, where countries are entering a next, 
possibly larger economic crisis, whose ef-
fects on family policies remain to be seen. 
We start by distinguishing between dif-
ferent variants of social investment (Sec-
tion 2). The third section then accounts 
for the case selection and methodology of 
the study. Later sections briefly present the 
findings of the individual country studies 
and a comparative conclusion. Based on 
the findings, the article shows that strong 
cutbacks in family cash benefits have been 
more common, whereas public childcare 
and parental leaves proved more resilient 
in the four investigated countries.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: 
DIFFERENT VARIANTS OF 
SOCIAL INVESTMENT
Recent years have seen the rise of the so-
cial-investment perspective, even the notion 
of a ‘social investment welfare state’ (Morel 
et al., 2012). Such a popular term, however, 
risks being used as a buzzword in political 
discourses without being translated in actu-
al policies. This section sets out to develop 
concepts to investigate the extent and ways 
in which social investment is actually im-
plemented in family policy reforms.
Starting with the definition of paradig-
matic social investment policies, these are 
‘capacitating social policies’ (Van Kers-
bergen et al., 2014), such as education and 
active labour-market policies. In the area 
of family policy, which is drawn to the 
core of a social-investment strategy, they 
are conceived as positive de-familialistic2 
measures, such as high-quality childcare or 
leave policies that promote female employ-
ment (Morgan, 2012). It has been shown, 
however, that social investment is an um-
brella concept, and also a somewhat ambig-
uous one (Cantillon and Van Lancker, 2013; 
Nolan, 2013). Bonoli (2012) described how 
active-labour-market policies can be a con-
tinuation of (neoliberal) workfare policies 
rather than the social-investment oriented 
development of ‘more and better jobs’. Also, 
Jenson (2009) pointed out that, while gender 
and work-family reconciliation are at the 
centre of the social-investment discourse, 
core issues of gender equality are typical-
ly left out (e.g. men’s care work, equal pay) 
and, as a consequence, the social-invest-
ment perspective might even eliminate a 
gender-equality perspective. 
In order to grasp the role of social invest-
ment in recent family policy reforms, it is 
thus helpful to distinguish between differ-
ent variants. One crucial dimension is how 
social investment interacts with alternative 
social policy perspectives. With regard to 
social policy in general, Morel et al. (2012) 
have made a well-known distinction be-
tween the three perspectives of Keynesian-
ism, Neo-liberalism, and Social investment. 
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Combining this with another categorisation, 
which focuses specifically on the area of 
family policy (Blum et al., 2014), we may 
distinguish three social policy perspectives: 
a ‘social protection/compensation’ and an 
‘austerity’ perspective alongside the social 
investment perspective.3
As defined by Van Kersbergen et al. 
(2014), social protection entails ‘measures 
geared towards the compensation of the in-
come losses of individuals by expanding a 
programme’s generosity or coverage’. Clas-
sical social protection policies focus on the 
male breadwinner and the traditional family 
(Morel et al., 2012: 6), which also entails 
benefits to compensate for the existence 
of children (through child benefits, for in-
stance). Social protection policies often go 
hand-in-hand with ‘familialist’ measures 
(such as cash-for-care benefits or pension 
credits for childrearing), i.e. measures 
which shift care responsibility to the family 
and support parents, in particular mothers, 
of small children to care for their children 
at home (Szelewa and Polakowski, 2008; 
Leitner, 2003; Esping-Andersen, 1999). In-
deed, this female care work has been ‘(p)art 
and parcel of the Keynesian-Beveridgean 
welfare compromise’ (Hemerijck, 2015).  
The perspective of austerity stresses the 
necessity of making savings and cutting 
back on existing benefits, e.g. by decreasing 
benefit generosity, or ‘targeting’ the measure 
on certain groups. As Hood et al. (2014) de-
scribe it, austerity goes beyond fiscal pru-
dency by invoking neo-liberal ideas. In this 
vein, welfare state spending and expenditure 
is primarily seen as a burden, while less state 
involvement and cost containment are advo-
cated, and ascribed positive effects regarding 
growth and employment (Blyth, 2013). For 
family policy, this can translate into clear re-
trenchment measures (e.g. decreasing child 
benefits), but also into increasing individual 
responsibility (e.g. restricting rights to child-
care), or privatisation of services (see Nyby 
et al., 2017).  
In the literature, these different social 
policy perspectives are sometimes de-
scribed as standing next to each other as 
separate categories, yet this is not quite 
the case. First, social-investment policies 
and social-protection policies can be dis-
tinguished as separate perspectives (see 
also Borosch et al., 2016; Van Kersbergen 
et al., 2014), yet it is important to highlight 
that they are not contradictory, but can go 
hand-in-hand and be mutually reinforc-
ing (European Commission, 2013b). The 
austerity perspective, on the other hand, is 
contradictory to social protection or social 
investment, and may negatively affect re-
spective measures.   
Taking this into account, the specific 
variant of social investment followed in a 
country does not only result from its social 
investment policies, but also from the inter-
action with alternative social policy per-
spectives and policies. On this basis, we can 
distinguish between different variants in the 
degree of social investment (see Figure 1). 
These differ in whether we find stronger or 
lower investment in social-investment poli-
cies (or even disinvestments), and the extent 
to which they coexist with investments in 
or cutbacks of social-protection policies.4 
To begin with, the ‘textbook case’ is 
what Bothfeld and Rouault (2013) call 
comprehensive social investment. Here, 
‘adequate minimum income protection is 
3  In line with this research, we suggest that ‘austerity’ is the currently prevailing concept (see e.g. Blyth, 
2013), which we will use instead of neo-liberalism. Like social investment, austerity has also been described as 
an ambiguous term, though. Furthermore, when focused on policy outputs, ‘Keynesianism’ entails (‘passive’) 
risk protection, social insurances and policies to sustain demand (see e.g. Morel et al., 2012).  
 4  Strong expansions of social protection policies are not to be expected based on the theoretical and empi-
rical literature, but in our typology these would be equivalent to small adaptations. 
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a critical precondition for an effective so-
cial investment strategy’ (Hemerijck, 2015: 
248; see also Morel et al., 2012). In that 
sense, comprehensive social investment 
goes hand-in-hand with social protection, 
particularly for vulnerable groups. Cor-
respondingly, we would find strong social 
investment policies and investments or at 
least no major cutbacks of social-protection 
policies under such an approach. 
talk of crowding-out social investment, 
where social-investment policies are ex-
panded, but ‘at the cost’ of social-protec-
tion measures, where we find significant 
retrenchment. 
Furthermore, a ‘social-investment strat-
egy’ may be spoken of while actual invest-
ments remain low. If such low investments 
in social-investment policies are accompa-








Strength of social-investment focus
Source: Own figure.
In practice, however, social investment 
is not necessarily contradictory to welfare 
state retrenchment, as it can go hand in 
hand with a shift-away from ‘passive’ so-
cial protection and produce ‘Matthew ef-
fects’, whereby middle- and higher-income 
groups are privileged (Cantillon, 2011; 
Bonoli et al., 2017)5. In that case, we may 
of social-protection policies, we may speak 
of a lean social investment type (Van Kers-
bergen et al., 2014). This is also reminiscent 
of what Hemerijck (2017; see Bonoli, 2013) 
labels as ‘affordable social investment’. Last 
but not least, we may of course also find the 
absence of a social-investment focus (or 
disinvestments of a previous such focus), 
5  Cantillon (2011) identified declining generosity of traditional income support and argued that social in-
vestment ‘may at least in part be responsible for disappointing poverty trends’. 
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again going more or less hand-in-hand with 
social-protection reforms.
METHODOLOGY
To effect a comparative analysis of four 
countries, we will narrow the focus here to 
three core family-policy areas (Gauthier, 
2010, p. 3): child/family cash benefits and 
tax reliefs; parental leave; and childcare. 
How would these policies look like under 
the different social-investment variants 
distinguished above? Childcare and leaves 
are more vital within a social-investment 
approach, while cash transfers are more 
typically associated with classical so-
cial-protection policies (see Borosch et al., 
2016; Bouget et al., 2015; Van Kersbergen 
et al., 2014). Part of the cash benefits can 
be what Hemerijck (2015: 248) associates 
with a ‘buffer’ function or ‘Keynesianism 
through the back door’ within a social-in-
vestment approach. While leave policies 
are often labelled as social investment per 
se, we argue that only ‘gender-equal leaves’ 
(Dobrotić and Blum, 2019; Dearing, 2016), 
aimed at work-family reconciliation and 
re-commodification of women, are in line 
with a social-investment approach. Famil-
ialist leaves, on the other hand, are a classi-
cal social-protection measure and actually 
a cornerstone of the Keynesian approach. 
Thus, we operationalise childcare and gen-
der-equal leave reforms as social-invest-
ment policies, while cash/tax benefit and 
familialist leave reforms are operationalised 
as social-protection policies. While this 
distinction is somewhat simplifying and in 
reality not clear-cut,6 it has already been 
successfully employed for analytical pur-
poses by other studies (e.g. van Kersbergen 
et al., 2014). Measures against ‘child pov-
erty’ may illustrate this analytical distinc-
tion: from a social-protection perspective, a 
prime measure against this problem would 
be cash benefits (such as child benefits), 
whereas a social-investment perspective 
prioritizes employability of (single) parents 
and education. From the austerity perspec-
tive, we would primarily expect cutbacks of 
social-protection policy, but a general aus-
terity climate may support disinvestments 
of social-investment policies, too. 
Austria, Finland, Portugal and Slove-
nia can be seen as different welfare state 
types historically.7 While all four countries 
adopted a certain social-investment focus 
(see Bouget et al., 2015), their different 
traditions relate to a different currency of 
social-investment ideas. Namely, in specific 
typologies of family policy and familialism, 
the four countries show an interesting vari-
ation. Austria has a strong familialist tradi-
tion (Leitner, 2003) and has only recently 
adopted a social-investment focus, whereas 
Finland as a Nordic country shows more 
de-familialistic traditions, but also some 
mixed idiosyncracies (ibid.). Amongst the 
post-socialist countries, Slovenia has been 
connected with supported de-familialism 
(Javornik, 2014), and comparatively strong 
social-investment traditions (e.g. through 
public childcare). Portugal as a South-
ern-European type shares the rather resid-
ual welfare state tradition (e.g. in childcare), 
but in the early 2000s a ‘decisive Scandi-
navian turn’ (Ciccia and Verloo, 2012: 522) 
was diagnosed in its parental leave polices, 
6  This is also highlighted by the European Commission (2013b) which states three welfare state functi-
ons (social investment, social protection, stabilisation of the economy) and that social ‘policies often have two 
or even all three of the functions’, so that it would be ‘misleading to allocate individual parts of a budget to 
a specific function’. Against this backdrop, such functions can only be identified through in-depth qualitative 
assessment of the measures. 
 7 Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology designates Austria as conservative, and Finland as a hybrid version 
of the social-democratic model. Portugal has been characterised as Southern-European (Ferrara, 1996) and Slo-
venia as a post-socialist welfare state (Cerami and Vanhuysse, 2009). 
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Figure 2
Real GDP growth (percentage change on previous year)
Source: Eurostat.
with a focus on gender-equal work share 
and social-investment ideas. Bothfeld and 
Rouault (2013: 60) argued that EU countries 
will adopt different social-investment strat-
egies ‘according to their basic welfare-type 
pattern’. Against that backdrop, a compar-
ison between the four countries is particu-
larly interesting. Especially in the countries 
with a weaker social-investment tradition, it 
is plausible that an external shock, such as 
the crisis, brought a new logic to policymak-
ing, emphasising a need for retrenchment 
and therefore putting a halt to cost-inten-
sive social-intensive measures. For exam-
ple, Kersbergen et al. (2014: 895) concluded 
from their study of post-crisis reforms that 
family and work-life reconciliation policies 
in Denmark and Germany ‘seem to be con-
sidered luxuries which governments can no 
longer afford’. 
addressed as an outlook in the conclud-
ing section. While the extent to which the 
countries were affected by the ‘Great Re-
cession’ differed (see Figure 2), the timing 
at which they were hit and developed back 
into GDP growth was similar. The chosen 
period of investigation thus enables us to 
study the social-investment pathways in 
family policies comparatively; which were 
possibly also affected by the severity of 
crisis (with Portugal and Slovenia being 
particularly hard hit; see Figure 2). The em-
pirical evidence for the study is based on an 
analysis of policy change in each country 
and semi-structured interviews with policy 
experts. The interviews were conducted in 
late 2014 and early 2015 in Austria (8 in-
terviews, including a focus group), Finland 
(5), Portugal (8), and Slovenia (7). The in-
terviewed experts mainly included policy-
As regards the period of investigation, 
our analysis covers the (post-)crisis years 
from 2008 to 2015; later developments are 
makers and ministry officials, but also the 
representatives of interest groups, NGOs, 
social workers and researchers. The par-
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ticipants in the focus groups were benefit 
recipients and claimants. The evidence is 
backed up by an analysis of key documents, 
such as legal texts, parliamentary protocols, 
or newspaper articles.
FAMILY POLICY REFORMS 
AND SOCIAL-INVESTMENT 
VARIANTS IN FOUR 
COUNTRIES
Existing research on crisis-related fam-
ily policies which reviewed the situation in 
the EU to 2010 (Gauthier, 2010; Richard-
son, 2010), showed that both retrenchment 
and expansionary measures were involved. 
The expansion was often part of econom-
ic-stimulus measures, such as investments 
into childcare facilities. Austerity mea-
sures, dominating in 2010, included post-
ponements of planned expansions, cuts in 
family benefits, and reductions in parental 
leave. Expansionary measures were more 
frequently reported in the area of work-life 
balance, and cutbacks more in cash bene-
fits (Gauthier, 2010). We now present our 
research which covers the policy develop-
ments in the four countries from 2008 to 
2015 (for a comparative overview see Table 
1 in the Annex).
Austria
While Austria went through the fiscal 
and economic crisis comparatively un-
scathed, there have been different stages 
of policy responses during the time when 
successive grand coalitions of Social Demo-
crats and Conservatives were in government 
since 2007. In the first stage of econom-
ic-stimulus measures, expansionary reforms 
were introduced in the fields of family cash/
tax benefits and childcare services. In 2009, 
childcare costs were made tax deductible, 
up to €2,300 per year and child. Also, the 
general tax credits for children were raised. 
Both measures were part of a larger tax re-
form, which had been planned earlier, but 
was brought forward with the economic cri-
sis identified as an argument for this earlier 
implementation (Blum et al., 2014). 
Regarding parental leave, an additional 
income-dependent variant was introduced 
from 2010. This increased the number of 
available variants to five. The new variant 
replaces 80% of the former net income for 
12 months, plus an additional 2 months if 
these extra months are taken by the other 
parent. It therefore aimed at a quicker re-
turn to paid employment as compared with 
the other, longer variants that continue to 
exist; those targeted include higher-edu-
cated mothers and fathers as leave takers. 
Gender-equal leave was thus expanded. An 
expansionary focus was also visible in pub-
lic childcare. A compulsory last pre-school 
year that is free of charge for the parents 
was introduced in 2009. As an investment 
in infrastructure and corresponding jobs 
in this sector, the measure was part of an 
economic-stimulus package. It showed a 
social-investment focus and was directed 
at enhancing language skills of children, 
particularly in the context of integration 
policy (Der Standard, 2008). 
In the second stage of crisis-oriented 
measures, overall family policy expenditure 
in Austria shrank in 2011 – for the first time 
after a long phase of continuous expansion. 
The age limit to receive family allowance 
for ‘children’ in education was reduced 
from 26 to 24 years. Family allowance was 
completely abolished for job-seeking ‘chil-
dren’ aged 18 to 21 years. The sole-earner 
tax deduction was abolished for couples 
not receiving family allowance. Overall, 
this austerity focus of 2010/11 remained 
limited when compared to many other EU 
countries, and targeted family cash and 
tax benefits. 
Childcare for under-threes has been sig-
nificantly expanded since 2008. Repeated 
investment packages were agreed upon by 
the national government and the federal 
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states (the latter being responsible for child-
care in Austria). As a result, participation 
rates for under-threes in formal childcare 
rose from 11.8% in 2008 to 25.5% in 2015 
(Statistik Austria, 2008, 2015). 
Childcare remained an important issue 
on the political agenda. The next set of re-
forms was initiated by the grand coalition of 
Social Democrats and Conservatives (2013-
17) after the national elections of Septem-
ber 2013. 2014 saw the most comprehensive 
agreement on childcare expansion, whereby 
the central state invested €305 million and 
the federal states €135 million until 2017. 
Once again the places for under-threes were 
prioritised, but funds were also invested in 
the training of child-minders and the expan-
sion of all-day schooling. Furthermore, an-
other – larger – reform of the family allow-
ance was set in train: the universal benefit 
was raised by 4%, with subsequent raises 
by 1.9% both in 2016 and 2018. 
Overall, with the notable exception of 
the 2011 austerity measures, the 2008-2015 
pathway of Austrian family policy was one 
of expansion. This can be traced back to the 
comparatively low crisis effects, as well as 
the prevalence of social-investment ideas. 
As one interviewed expert put it:
Looking back at the last years, there 
have been quite a few improvements 
in family policy, namely regarding the 
childcare infrastructure. It came as a bit 
of a surprise, there have never been such 
high funds before. But it has also been 
inserted into the crisis reaction to say: 
Investments, we need investments! And 
it has worked out that childcare was seen 
as an element in this. (Interview AT-1) 
Part of this is a new understanding of 
social services not as a burden, but as a mo-
tor for employment – where ‘particularly 
in times of high unemployment it is clever 
to invest here’ (Interview AT-1). This in-
cludes both the direct creation of jobs (e.g. 
for pedagogues, building industry) and the 
support of (women’s) employment by pro-
viding public childcare. Overall, Austrian 
family policy has been dominated by the 
focus on work-life balance – in the Social 
democratic party, but increasingly also 
amongst the Conservatives (Focus group 
AT-1). This is seen as part of family policy 
modernisation (Focus group AT-1; Inter-
view AT-1), which is most evident in the 
parental leave benefit reforms: there, the 
social-investment perspective partly side-
lined the strong familialist social-protection 
tradition (Leitner, 2003).  
Finland
In Finland, the most immediate family 
policy response to the international finan-
cial crisis was expansive, with piecemeal 
improvements of some family cash trans-
fers (e.g. child benefits). Since the crisis 
was viewed as temporary, the centre-right 
government in office at the time (2007-10) 
sought to shelter families from the eco-
nomic downturn in line with a social-pro-
tection perspective, rather than resorting 
to austerity measures (Nygård and Autto 
2014; Interviews FI-1-3). Simultaneously, 
however, steps were also taken to enhance 
the social-investment perspective in Finn-
ish family policy. The centre-right coali-
tions in office 2007-10 and 2010-11 acted 
as vanguards for these social-investment 
reforms, but some of them were not imple-
mented until the reign of the subsequent 
right-left (‘six-pack’) coalition (2011-14). 
The perhaps most important reforms were 
the gradual extension of the fathers’ leave 
(in 2010 and 2013) and the introduction of 
a flexible care allowance (in 2014). Together 
these sought to increase the level of parental 
(notably maternal) employment, strengthen 
gender equality and enhance work-family 
balance (Finnish Parliament, 2013; Inter-
views FI-1-4).
However, considering the fact that so-
cial-investment policies, such as public 
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childcare, have a long tradition in Finland, 
these investments perhaps represent little 
‘new under the sun’. Rather, they can be 
seen as steps of a national adaptation to EU 
policy recommendations (e.g. the Europe 
2020 strategy) striving e.g. at higher paren-
tal employment as a way of strengthening 
the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state 
(Nygård and Autto 2014; Interview FI-5).
The combination of (modest) cash-ben-
efit improvements and investments in pa-
rental leave (and work-family balance) 
during the period 2009-14 thus suggests a 
policy development in accordance with a 
comprehensive social-investment variant. 
However, since 2012 this pathway became 
gradually intertwined with an austerity per-
spective, advocating stricter fiscal control 
and cutbacks in family cash benefits and 
services. In the face of continuing economic 
recession in Finland, the right-left coalition 
gradually abandoned a social-protection 
perspective and focussed more squarely 
on cutting expenditures and balancing the 
public economy while simultaneously com-
mitting to the imperative of getting more 
parents into the labour market (Nyby et al., 
2018; Nygård and Autto, 2014).
The main objective here was to get more 
mothers into the labour market, even as 
part-time employed. […] This is just an 
example of how the economic situation 
and the employment imperative are used 
to justify reforms. (Interview FI-4)
In 2012, the government temporarily 
abolished the yearly inflation adjustments of 
the child benefit for a three-year period. A 
direct cutback of the child benefit followed 
in 2014 (by 8%). To compensate low-income 
families, a child-tax deduction was intro-
duced, but this was criticised for being in-
efficient since low-income families pay low 
taxes and are therefore unlikely to benefit 
from such a deduction (Interview FI-4). 
However, the perhaps most conspicuous cut-
back was the curtailment of the right to full-
time childcare in 2015. This reform, which 
was preceded by another reform aimed at 
strengthening the educational quality of 
the childcare system (also in 2015), abol-
ished the longstanding universal right for 
all children to receive full-time childcare, 
by making this conditional of parental 
employment. Also the ‘familialist’ child 
home-care allowance (and leave) system, 
enabling home-care of children under three, 
became subject to increasing criticism for 
being counter-productive to parental em-
ployment and gender equality (Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health, 2011). However, 
it has so far remained unchanged, which 
suggests that familialist values still hold 
sway alongside social-investment ideas of 
gender equality.
Taken together, the Finnish family poli-
cy development 2012-15 can be said to have 
shifted from a comprehensive towards a 
lean social-investment variant. Several cut-
backs have been made in both family cash 
benefits and the universal right to public 
childcare has been restricted, while expan-
sive social investments have been scarce 
after 2014. True, in a way the restriction 
of the right to childcare can be considered 
as a way of forcing parents into the labour 
market, but it seems questionable if we ac-
tually can regard this as a ‘school-book’ 
social-investment manoeuvre. Instead, the 
policy development seems to have become 
increasingly conditioned by a need to con-
tain public expenditure, to cut government 
debt and achieve fiscal prudence in accor-
dance with ideas from an austerity perspec-
tive (cf. Blyth, 2013). 
In sum, the Finnish case shows that 
although the early responses to the great 
recession were expansive in terms of cash 
benefit improvements and a number of im-
portant reforms advocating parental em-
ployment and gender equality were made, 
since 2012 there has been a gradual shift 
towards at best a lean social-investment 
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variant, which has brought with it cutbacks 
in child benefits as well as public childcare. 
This shift and the cutbacks have been justi-
fied mainly by economic reasons – as inev-
itable actions needed to raise employment 
and to cut expenditures in order to main-
tain the fiscal sustainability of the Finnish 
welfare state. 
Portugal
Coming from a tradition underscoring 
a rudimentary, familialistic welfare state, 
Portuguese family policies after the transi-
tion to democracy (1974) introduced an ex-
plicit focus on state responsibilities to sup-
port a dual-earner, gender-equality-orient-
ed model. This led to a gradual but steady 
increase in entitlements to family benefits, 
leave schemes and public childcare services 
(Wall, 2011). During the early 2000s, this 
social-investment perspective was further 
expanded, both in the context of a centre-
right-wing coalition government and of two 
governments led by the socialist party. Fam-
ily benefits were increased; family diversity 
was underlined through support for lone 
parents and immigrant families; parental 
leave was made more generous and fathers’ 
involvement in childcare was promoted (e.g. 
compulsory two weeks fully-paid paterni-
ty leave in 2004; sharing bonus in 2009). 
Lastly, investment in childcare services 
had led, before the onset of austerity in 
2010, to coverage rates above the Barcelo-
na target of 33% for under-threes. Family 
policies during this expansionary phase 
had also shifted toward a specific welfare 
mix in which different actors – state, fam-
ilies, private profit and publicly-subsidised 
non-profit institutions – took on responsi-
bility jointly (Wall et al., 2013). 
Policy responses after 2010 followed 
two main steps. Between 2010 and mid-
2011 (Socialist Party in government), re-
forms focused on reducing benefit gener-
osity and strongly affected the main family 
benefit (two out of the five income levels 
were abolished, thereby increasing selectiv-
ity). Retrenchment was seen as a temporary 
cutback in benefits rather than a change in 
the long-term policy framework and a glob-
al-investment perspective in families. 
Between 2011 and 2014, following the 
intervention of the TROIKA (put in place 
as part of the country’s financial bailout) 
and the election of a right-wing coalition 
government, reforms involved retrenchment 
and a shift in policy discourse. Family pol-
icy moved into the shadow of social-poli-
cy ideas underlining weak governmental 
responsibilities, third-sector assistance 
and re-familialisation. To support needy 
persons in times of crisis, the government 
introduced one main policy instrument, the 
Social Emergency Programme. It aimed 
to reach out to individuals in extreme pov-
erty by providing support on an in-kind 
basis, through a network of third-sector 
canteens. Selectivity was increased and 
benefit amounts cut back further, while 
existing programmes to support childcare 
expansion were suspended. The retrench-
ment introduced in response to the crisis 
has thus affected all family policy areas, 
but was strongest in cash benefits (OECD, 
2014). Those were changed along two main 
lines: increased selectivity, with eligibility 
criteria focusing on support for families 
with very low income, and cutbacks in 
benefit amounts. The drop in the number 
of beneficiaries was sharp between 2010 
and 2011, and there has been a continuing 
decrease between 2011 and 2015. Addition-
ally, there were cutbacks in the support for 
‘very poor’ families on minimum-income 
benefits (e.g. sharp decrease in benefit 
amounts per child). 
The interviews with policy experts and 
representatives of local NGOs and author-
ities highlighted the consequences of these 
developments. Policy experts reflected 
mainly on the implications of austerity for 
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low-income families, those which, accord-
ing to them, should receive more support in 
times of crisis. Commenting on the average 
poverty rate, which rose to 22% in 2012 for 
families with children (compared to 15% 
for families without children), one expert 
considered that ‘a basic measure to fight 
poverty intensity and to reach out to the 
poorest of the poor, has been almost neu-
tralised’. NGO representatives underlined 
that retrenchment had weakened support for 
families living in ‘endemic poverty’. They 
also highlighted ‘new contexts of poverty’, 
such as average-income families hit by un-
employment and salary cuts. 
Policies concerning leave entitlements 
and services underwent less change. The 
promotion of work-family balance for 
dual-earner families with children has 
remained on the policy agenda, even if 
measures also underline retrenchment. For 
example, in the absence of programmes to 
expand the number of crèches, the main 
measure adopted was a legal change al-
lowing for more children per classroom. 
There were also cutbacks in other fields of 
work-family balance, such as extra-school 
activities – thereby shifting more responsi-
bility on to families. 
The economic crisis therefore led to 
major changes in Portuguese family policy. 
Policies moved away from a social-invest-
ment pathway and state responsibilities, 
towards an implicit and residual perspec-
tive. Nevertheless, faced with rising pov-
erty levels and negative trends regarding 
family wellbeing (e.g. fertility dropped to 
1.21 in 2013), governmental policies from 
2014 onwards re-introduced a focus on the 
need to invest in families and children. 
Rather than a comprehensive social-invest-
ment perspective for families though, one 
main objective was underlined: promoting 
fertility. The 2014 tax reform introduced 
changes in income-splitting arrangements 
to explicitly promote large families. Other 
measures included increasing compulsory 
paternity leave by one week. There was 
thus a gradual return to a lean social-invest-
ment variant, but in a new context where it 
was mixed with paradigms of familialism 
(and pro-natalism) as well as austerity (e.g. 
subjection of family policy to ‘poor relief’ 
perspectives). 
Slovenia
In Slovenia, the major driver behind the 
recent welfare reforms was the challenge of 
ensuring sustainability of the welfare sys-
tem and responding to the economic crisis 
(Filipovič Hrast and Kopač Mrak, 2016). 
New social legislation came into force in 
2012 and brought significant changes in 
the field of social and family benefits. Ac-
cording to the interviewed policy experts 
and government documents, the aim was 
to form a more just, effective and long-term 
sustainable welfare state. The law intro-
duced a common entry point for all family 
and social benefits and defined uniform el-
igibility criteria for different benefits and 
for assessing income and property of house-
holds. Furthermore, as a direct response to 
the crisis, two intervention acts were ad-
opted that introduced temporary austerity 
measures with an indefinite time limit: they 
are to remain in force until one year after 
national economic growth exceeds 2.5% of 
GDP. These reforms made family benefits 
more means-tested, and lowered the level of 
some benefits, including leave policies. This 
was the first time after the Slovene indepen-
dence that family policy was affected by 
austerity measures, despite the fact that the 
mid-1990s were years of economic crisis. 
 In 2014, a new ‘Parental Protection and 
Family Benefits Act’ was passed, which 
brought changes in leave policies and child 
benefits for single parents. In line with the 
social-investment perspective of promot-
ing work-life balance and mothers’ em-
ployment, it introduced more gender-equal 
Rev. soc. polit., god. 27, br. 3, str. 249-267, Zagreb 2020.
261
Blum S., Correia S., Nygård M., Rakar T., Wall K.: Social Investment...
leave policies and changed parental leave 
from a family entitlement to an individual 
entitlement. Most of these measures came 
into force in 2014, but the expansionary 
measures (e.g. gradual prolongation of paid 
paternity leave) have a delayed implementa-
tion dependent upon GDP growth exceed-
ing 2.5%. Furthermore, the child benefit for 
lone parents was increased, thus focusing on 
the most disadvantaged families. However, 
it reaches only a small part of lone-parent 
families, due to the narrow definition of this 
group and an implementation gap.
The evidence suggests that the post-cri-
sis family policy reforms in Slovenia have 
been predominately characterised by re-
trenchment and austerity. With the introduc-
tion of strict means-testing, a shift towards 
selectivity in family policy can be identi-
fied, targeting not at families in general, 
but the most disadvantaged groups. This 
shift is best shown in the paradigmatic 
change in the purpose of the child benefit. 
The function was no longer to cover for 
extra expenses associated with children 
but rather to provide a survival income for 
poor families. The child benefit is no longer 
something that represents an ‘added value’, 
but rather a ‘social corrective’ intended for 
the survival of the family (Interview SI-4). 
Regarding childcare subsidies, austerity 
measures were introduced in the form of 
a new calculation of family income. Fur-
thermore, the second child co-currently 
enrolled in preschool no longer attends free 
of charge. Leave policies were also affected, 
since the wage compensation for parental 
and paternity leave was lowered, and an 
upper ceiling for the maternity leave bene-
fit was introduced. However, the most fun-
damental changes and austerity measures 
were in the area of family cash benefits, 
which, as mentioned above, were framed as 
social transfers for the most needy, in line 
with increased selectivity. Nevertheless, 
there is evidence of some social-investment 
orientation, e.g. childcare services saw no 
cutbacks. 
The changes in the examined period can 
be interpreted as a shift from the pre-crisis 
pathway, which was characterised by ex-
tending social-investment policies, stem-
ming from the socialist past and communist 
ideology about gender equality (Kanjuo 
Mrčela and Černigoj Sadar, 2011), to a path-
way marked by austerity and retrenchment 
– predominantly in the area of social-pro-
tection policies. It is telling that the gov-
ernment decided to prolong most austerity 
measures and only partly introduce expan-
sionary ones, even when Slovenia’s GDP 
reached the required growth rate in 2014 
(2.6%). As stressed by a policymaker:
Regarding the austerity measures, ev-
ery policy should make some sacrifices 
to show cooperation. And we put our 
efforts in the compromises to choose 
the cuts by which families will be least 
affected, since the families are the ones 
indirectly affected by all the interven-
tion measures and suffer the most. (In-
terview SI-3)
CONCLUSIONS: FAMILY 
POLICY REFORMS AND 
SOCIAL-INVESTMENT 
VARIANTS
The case studies show that there have 
been different stages to post-crisis family 
policy reforms and that there is a consider-
able cross-national variation. Austria and 
Finland show the first stage of economic 
stimulus measures around 2009/10 (e.g. 
childcare expansion in Austria). In the 
second stage, all of the five countries im-
plemented crisis-related austerity measures 
around 2010/11. In Austria and Finland 
these austerity packages remained limit-
ed, while in the other two countries they 
were more extensive. After 2012, Austria 
and Finland parted company: Austria im-
plemented largely expansionary family 
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policy reforms, while in Finland the initial 
expansions were increasingly accompanied 
by cutbacks, e.g. in the main child benefit. 
Portugal and Slovenia did not exit the stage 
of strong cutbacks in family policy until 
2015. In these two countries, an austeri-
ty-oriented programme continued to drive 
developments (although each also shows 
some limited social investment). 
In order to conceptually grasp the vary-
ing character of social investment and its 
relation to other social-policy perspectives, 
we distinguished four possible directions: 
comprehensive, crowding-out, or lean social 
investment, as well as the absence of a so-
cial-investment focus (Section 2). The em-
pirical analysis reveals that the four coun-
tries show very different variants of social 
investment. These are not necessarily stable 
within one country over the whole period 
(2008-2015).  
On the one hand, the social-investment 
approach seems to be of importance in 
all the countries. Ideas around social-in-
vesting family policies seem to have often 
safeguarded the areas of parental leave 
and childcare from (direct) cutbacks. This 
corresponds to the results of Adema and 
Ali (2015: 145), who found that ‘leave ar-
rangements and childcare support systems 
have remained largely unscathed in most 
OECD countries’, while many countries 
implemented cutbacks in financial family 
support in view of budgetary pressures (see 
also Bouget et al., 2015: 23). Crowding-out 
social investment therefore seems quite 
common. As regards social policy in gener-
al, Borosch et al. (2016) also report that uni-
versal risk-prevention programmes suffered 
cutbacks in many European welfare states.
And yet, both the strength of social-in-
vestment policies as well as the relation to 
more classical social-protection policies 
differ. In Austria, the social-investment per-
spective that leads the welfare state to invest 
in children, mothers’ employment and new 
jobs in the social sector gained significant 
traction. Traditional familialist ideas were 
side-lined in the process, but by no means 
replaced, as there remains a strong emphasis 
on family care predominantly provided by 
women (Österle and Heitzmann, 2020: 33). 
At the same time, austerity ideas remained 
marginal in Austria, also in social-protec-
tion measures, wherefore the dominating 
pathway is one of comprehensive social 
investment. In the beginning of the inves-
tigated period, this was similar in Finland, 
but from 2012 onwards family policy there 
has become increasingly viewed as an 
economic burden. Such economic-burden 
arguments are contradictory to social-in-
vestment arguments. In the consequence, 
the Finnish case study shows cutbacks not 
only in the social-protection area (child 
benefit), but partly also in social-invest-
ment policies (decreased right of children 
to public childcare in the case of non-work-
ing parents) – thus forming at best a lean 
social-investment variant. 
In Portugal and Slovenia, the dominant 
perspective of family policy reform in the 
years 2008 to 2015 was that associated with 
austerity. In both countries, the central re-
form thrust was to focus family policy on 
those ‘most in need’. This corresponds to 
findings for overarching social policy trends 
in Europe, which emphasise retrenchment, 
activation, early intervention, and also an 
increased selectivity (Borosch et al., 2016). 
In a number of European countries, a milieu 
of permanent austerity seems characteristic 
of the current period. The case studies show 
how this can sometimes replace social-in-
vestment ideas, but sometimes also co-ex-
ist with them and give social investment a 
particular spin. As a case in point, Slovenia 
was on a pathway of austerity, due to strong 
cutbacks in social-protection policies in 
line with increased selectivity, and at the 
same time ‘sheltering’ social-investment 
policies (such as childcare, leave policies), 
which also witnessed some expansionary 
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measures in terms of introducing more gen-
der-equal policies.8 Portugal, however, not 
only poses an example of the social-invest-
ment perspective being sidelined by the aus-
terity paradigm, but also of its re-emergence 
in a changed context. Since the end of 2015, 
also following a change of government, 
social-investment ideas have re-emerged 
in Portugal. But while the focus is shifting 
again toward social-investment perspectives 
and increased state responsibilities, the pre-
viously established ‘poor-relief’ perspective 
of austerity also continues to prevail. 
Extending the view to more recent devel-
opments reveals both continuity and change. 
In Austria, yet another reform of the child-
care benefit was introduced, effective from 
March 2017, which is in line with social 
investment. The four flat-rate variants were 
transformed into a flexible ‘time account’, 
and a gender-equality bonus is now paid if 
parents share the leave equally. In Portugal, 
in 2016 the focus turned to the gradual re-
moval of cutbacks, new measures to increase 
cash benefits for families with children be-
low age three, and state support to promote 
work-family balance through service ex-
pansion. In Slovenia, in 2018 some of the 
austerity measures were abolished (in child 
benefit and childbirth grant), and paid pater-
nity leave was prolonged. This trend contin-
ued in 2019 (concerning parental leave, child 
benefit, and large family allowance). Yet the 
newer developments do not suffice to say 
that a social-investment focus would have 
re-emerged over the austerity course, since 
the selectivity of social protection legislation 
became permanent (Filipovič Hrast and Ra-
kar, 2020: 497). In Finland, the drive towards 
austerity has even increased, e.g. resulting in 
2016 in a complete abolishment of the yearly 
indexation of child benefits (see also Nyby 
et al., 2017). 
To conclude, the case studies have 
shown how social investment has remained 
important for the family policy packages in 
all the four countries, also during the crisis, 
but social-investment variants differ consid-
erably – ranging from comprehensive social 
investment (Austria) to its crowding-out in 
face of austerity (Slovenia); while Finland 
and Portugal showed a lean social-invest-
ment approach. This shows how social-in-
vestment variants vary in their implemen-
tation, depending on the timing and how 
they are combined with other perspectives, 
particularly austerity and social protection. 
Longer-term family policy directions fol-
lowing the Covid-19 crisis need to be await-
ed, but our findings could be revelatory in 
this regard and, in the future it will probably 
be important to compare both periods. Our 
results underline the points made by Bonoli 
et al. (2017) about the ambiguity of the so-
cial-investment perspective, and how it may 
be understood as building up on traditional 
social protection, or as (partly) replacing 
it. Our results contradict a tendency in the 
literature to describe the social-investment, 
social-protection and austerity perspectives 
as separate and distinct (e.g. Blum et al., 
2014). We suggest that while it is helpful to 
conceptually distinguish between the per-
spectives, it is even more helpful to further 
develop conceptually how they are com-
bined, what the resulting logics are in terms 
of actual policy reforms, and, in future re-
search, how the co-existence of different 
configurations can be explained.
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Sažetak
SOCIJALNO ULAGANJE U DOBA ŠTEDNJE: USPOREDBA REFORMI 
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Ovaj je rad usmjeren na reforme obiteljske politike u četiri europske zemlje – Austriji, 
Finskoj, Portugalu i Sloveniji – između 2008. i 2015. godine. Te su godine obilježile „veli-
ka recesija“ i uspon  perspektive socijalnog ulaganja. Međutim, socijalno ulaganje je opći 
pojam i pomalo je dvosmislen. Ovaj rad razlučuje između različitih varijanti socijalnog 
ulaganja koje proizlaze iz usredotočenosti na interakcije socijalnog ulaganja i alternativ-
nih perspektiva socijalne politike, i to socijalne zaštite i štednje. U radu se identificiraju 
različite varijante u smislu stupnja socijalnog ulaganja: od sveobuhvatnog, preko istiski-
vanja do „skromnijih“ oblika socijalnog ulaganja. To je dovelo do oštrih rezova u obitelj-
skim novčanim davanjima, dok su se područja javne skrbi i roditeljskog dopusta pokazala 
otpornijima u analiziranim zemljama. Ovi su zaključci indikativni u sadašnjoj pandemiji 
COVID-19, kada se zemlje suočavaju s novom, možda i većom gospodarskom krizom.
Ključne riječi: obiteljska politika, kriza, socijalno ulaganje, štednja, studije slučaja.
